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ABSTRACT: This paper describes work undertaken as part of the TOSCA project to develop approaches integrating and enhancing safety, quality and productivity. The work reported here combines two existing approaches: task analysis and 4D process simulation to model tasks in a 3D environment, thus creating a 4D
model. The 4D model is next used for safety analysis (e.g., HAZOP a structured Hazid study) and optimization (e.g., Pareto type). The approach is demonstrated on an industrial case study involving the planning of a
infrequent cold water pressure testing of LPG storage tanks at a partner site. The results of the case study are
presented and discussed. The plant management was provided with a detailed list of the main tasks (22), subtasks (115), specific risks identified (procedural delays, occupational safety and process safety) and 19 specific recommendations for safety and time optimization of the planned testing procedure. This information was
warmly received by the plant management and field implementation of the procedure is planned for May
2015.
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper describes work undertaken as part of
the EU FP 7 TOSCA (Total Operations Management
for
Safety
Critical
Activities)
project
(http://www.toscaproject.eu) to develop approaches
for integrating and enhancing safety, quality and
productivity. One of the areas of research to be tackled is Design and Planning for Safety, and within
this an approach is being developed to assess the
risks involved in complex changes, for example due
to the introduction of new processes or procedures,
or, as in the case study discussed in this paper, nonroutine maintenance or inspection tasks. This methodology combines the human factors method of task
analysis with 4D process simulation to model the
system and identify areas for improvement, both in
terms of process safety and efficiency. 4D Simulation is a method that brings together Discrete Event
Simulation with a highly accurate 3D model of environment. The discrete event simulation is then run in
the 3D model and the results collected and analysed.
This paper will explain the overall approach, present
its application within the TOSCA project’s case
study applied to the periodic inspection of pressur-

ized vessels for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) storage. The inspection procedure, made of complex
manual procedures, is applied rather rarely (at least
every five years according to the law, but can be
substituted with less disturbing methods, so in reality full internal vessel inspections are done every 10+
years) thus affected to staff turnover, meaning that
previous experience and procedures may not be
available at the time of testing. In this paper we will
also present case study results in terms of recommendations generated by this approach for the plant
management for the coming full test procedure to be
carried out.
2 APPROACH
The approach builds on using the principal methods such as Task Analysis (TA) in relation to 4D
modelling and visualization of the operation under
analysis. This renders a clear representation to the
analysis team about the abstract details of the operation(s), next enabling them to apply the hazard identification methods, (e.g., HAZOP), qualitative risk
categories ranking, as well as efficiency (e.g., in

terms of resources needed, time, staffing, equipment,
etc.). The overall approach is graphically presented
in Figure 1 and suggests that decisions shall be taken
after the optimization step – where recommendations from previous steps are compiled and assessed
for the completeness and possibly about the tolerability of the residual risk levels. However, for example, in the case that the individual steps led to
changes/additions to the list of tasks under considerations, the whole assessment shall undertake an additional update iteration. The details of the specific
steps within the approach are given in the next subsections.
2.1 Task analysis
Task analysis is used to describe and evaluate the
human interactions in a system. As such, it forms the
basis of many human factors risk assessments. Task
analysis has been defined as the analysis of how a
task is accomplished, including a detailed description of both manual and mental activities, task and
element durations, task frequency, task allocation,
task complexity, environmental conditions, necessary clothing and equipment, and any other unique
factors involved in or required for one or more people to perform a given task (Kirwan, 1992). Without
these important representations of the sociotechnical system, it would not be possible to correctly analyse the system and identify and evaluate all
the relevant risks. Task analysis methods are widely
used by human factors professionals outside of risk
assessment and these methods are usually appropriate for supporting a risk assessment. Common task
analysis representations include Hierarchical Task
Analysis (HTA; Annett, 1967), Link Analysis
(Chapanis, 1996), Operational Sequence Diagrams
(Kirwan, 1992), Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA;
Stanton, 2005) as well as methods used more widely
outside the human factors domain such as Business

Figure 1: The graphical presentation of the proposed approach.

Process Modelling (Aguilar-Saven, 2004). In this
case, the Business Process Modelling approach was
used as incorporated in the SCOPE software (Builes
et al, 2014). SCOPE displays the task analysis in the
form of a process map and further provides a template for the analysis team to conduct a hazard identification technique, known assimilar to HazOp, on
the tasks. The information to feed the task analysis
can be gathered from documentation (e.g. procedures) as well as individual experience. In the case
of a rarely performed procedure, such as the case
study presented here, the task analysis may be an iterative process that is refined as the procedure becomes clearer. The 4D modelling is a key tool in facilitating this improvement.
2.2 4D modelling
Simulation can be defined as the imitation of the
operation of a real-world process or system over
time. The act of simulating something first requires
that a model be developed. This model represents
the key characteristics or behaviours of the selected
process (Banks, 2001). The model depicts the environment in which the process itself takes place, often
in a 3D manner; the simulation depicts the operation
of the process over the fourth dimension, time. This
paper focuses on the use of discrete-event simulation, which models a process as a discrete sequence
of well-defined events in time. Such events occur at
a particular instance in time, marking a state change
in the process (Robinson, 2004). Processes modelled
in a discrete-event simulation must include predetermined starting and ending points, and a list of discrete events that occur in between these points. Discrete-event simulation is commonly used to monitor
or predict procedures and processes in various industries, such as manufacturing.
Use of 4D simulation is beneficial as it employs
the “learn by doing” principle and Park (2011) state

Figure 2: The SCOPE program interface during the task analysis of the case.

that the positive impact of 4D simulation on productivity and safety is proven in construction processes.
This paper focuses on a case study which includes a
process, distributed across the production site, that is
undertaken quite infrequently. One of the key problems with improving processes on distributed sites is
the difficulty in visualizing the process (Sacks,
2009) and Kang (2007) demonstrated that logical er-

rors in construction schedules could be detected
quicker and more reliably using 4D models as compared to 2D drawings. In this instance, a simulation
would allow personnel to visualize and review the
process virtually, identifying potential improvements
as well as becoming better acquainted with it. It is
often not possible to achieve this using the real environment due to lack of access opportunities, risk of

damage to the plant, and risk of injuries to personnel. Using simulation to optimize, plan and prepare
for infrequent, complex activities minimizes these
risks during the actual operation.

mented and analysed. The capability of holding the
full analysis in one software application streamlines
the analysis and simplifies the documentation of the
analysis itself.

2.3 Safety Analysis

2.4 Optimization

The next step is safety analysis of the detailedthe
hazard identification based on the tasks for the hazards in the systemanalysis. This is based on using
the task analysis outline as the basic functional analysis and to then perform a structured Hazard identification perform a more broad workshop similar to a
HAZOP study (Kletz, 2006) where the nodes are on
individual (sub)tasks instead of parts of a plant. The
approach can be referred to as TASK HAZID (Leva
et al 2012). The HazidAZOP study involveds a team
workshop exercise with the team containing the appropriate expertise, including knowledge of the plant
and the planned operation, safety analysis, and human factors knowledge. The identification of hazards was accompanied at the same time with a semiquantitative risk category estimation in order to separate between safety and productivity issues. That
involved assigning the consequence classes on a 1 to
5 point scale, and similarly assigning their likelihood
of occurrence, while risk values were simply provided by multiplying both.
In the case study presented here, the TASK
HAZOP HAZID and risk categorization was carried
out in the SCOPE software (Builes et al, 2014)
which facilitates an examination of each node in the
task analysis, allowing each deviation to be docu-

Following the safety analysis, the optimization
process can be applied in two steps. The first is optimization of the 4D model and its (sub)tasks is performed with implementation and operating costs as
the dependant variables. The optimization then done
through an iterative method which tests each iterative arrangement over a statistically significant
number of simulation runs. The result is a local optimization within the system based on cost. The second step applies to the results of the task analysis
and the TASK HAZID HAZOP study, where the initial list of tasks is next refined and subjected to further optimization. We suggest that this optimization
be done when hazards are already revealed (thus,
e.g., after TASK HAZID) HAZOP study) and the
team can concentrate on the further aspects, e.g.,
time duration of the main tasks, pertaining costs, etc.
Finally a sensitivity analysis is done using a Pareto
type optimization (Pareto, 1906) on a given system/activity aspect shall be applied and opportunities for further improvements searched for and documented.

Figure 3: 4D simulation illustration from the case animation.

3 CASE STUDY – PROCESS AND RESULTS
OBTAINED
The case study was completed at the company
Plinarna Maribor d.o.o., LPG storage site located at
Maribor, Slovenia (project partner). The periodic
pressure vessel testing procedure consists of a number of steps. The pressure vessels considered are two
1000 m3 volume spherical above ground storage
tanks. The product stored (LPG) must be removed
first before the vessel is prepared for pressurized water testing, emptying, internal visual inspection, ultra-sound and X-ray spot testing, and finally to be
put back into operation. The individual steps are
connected in a logical order but the details and criteria to proceed or not were not so clear at the start for
the plant staff. The offer to analyse and re-develop
the detailed procedure using the proposed approach
outlined in earlier sections was accepted by the plant
manager.
3.1 Task analysis
The task analysis was carried-out by the team and
involving the site personnel. The task model was
constructed in SCOPE software tool. The high level
tasks and sub-tasks in the process were documented
(Figure 2). The task analysis also captured actors, information, tools and duration of each envisaged task.
During this step, 23 main tasks and 115 sub-tasks
were identified.

3.2 Creation of 3D visual and 4D model/simulation
The site was first photographed extensively with
a digital camera. Many pictures were taken from all
possible angles of the buildings, equipment and layout of the site. Those pictures were then used to 3D
models of the buildings and equipment at the site using photogrammetry software. Next, a highresolution image of the site was taken from Google
Earth. Finally, the 3D models of the buildings and
equipment were placed on the high-resolution image
to for a high accurate and easily recognizable 3D
model of the entire site.
A 4D simulation was built using the 3D model of
the site and the information from the task analysis.
The behaviour of the individual tasks were modelled, including stochastic values for process and
movement times. The simulation demonstrated the
planned operation in order to allow the optimization
of tasks and was annotated with information captured during the task analysis. Furthermore, the tool
aided in documenting this complex testing procedure
in advance and communicating the complex procedure to a variety of personnel. Figure 3 illustrates a
screen capture from the simulation.
3.3 Safety analysis

Figure 4: Task analysis diagrams for both the Original and the Optimized alternatives of the cold water pressure testing
procedure.

Overall, the Task based HAZOP hazard identification study (TASK HAZID) operated as a central
work point using both task analysis and 4D modelling as inputs and providing a list of recognized risks
and additional safety measures as a main result. The

team identified 26 potential deviations that could
lead to risksaccidental scenarios. The TASK HAZID
HAZOP study also suggested that we can expect
three different main types of unwanted consequenc-

Table 1: Summary of recommendations from the HAZOPTASK HAZID study done over task analysis results.
#
1

2
3

4

5

6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14

Related
tasks
Prepare a detailed written cold water testing procedure, following the tasks identified and implementing the spe- All
cific recommendations given next. Suggested main topics:
- General and specific planning of the testing (e.g., assurance of the contractors/equipment, list of all personnel
(internal/external)),
- Logic sequence of the tasks and sub-tasks, for each to consider validation criteria for completeness, as well as
to mention anticipated hazards and required permitting.
- Testing reporting - progress in time, persons involved - on suitable forms and check-lists, as well as to appoint
approvals to next step(s).
Use of the torch with two pilot flames with thermal lock system - in order to assure reliable pilot flame
5, 23
Consider purging of the remaining LPG gas in the storage tank at level between 95 % and 100 % by nitrogen,
7, 8, 22
from either car tanker with vaporizer, or from the bundled bottles.
Prepare a detailed nitrogen purging protocol, related to recommendation 1.
Permanently monitoring of the tank water fill-in process; to assure adequate staffing and specific appointed per- 7, 22, 23
son.
Setting on the SCADA for an audible alarm at 98 % of full tank.
The measurement instruments used, are to be checked constantly during the test, related to strain gauges and
7
movement of the tank observations.
In case of the deviation(s) stop the procedure, thus the criteria must be defined prior the cold water testing starts.
Note: additional task to be added to the previous task analysis to assure the mentioned equipment and contractors.
Plan the engagement of the contractors. Risk assessment of the operations and safety measures to be in place ac- 8, 16,
cording to the national legislation on occupational health and safety, e.g., regarding work at height, falling ob18, 20,
jects/tools, work in closed spaces or potentially oxygen depleted atmosphere/flammable atmosphere, as well as 21
common workplaces.
Consider in the procedure to check the water level before removing the valve at the end of task 8 (in order to as- 8
sure low enough amount of the remaining gas inside tank).
In recommendation 1 consider also planning of the suitable crane with long enough arm to reach top of the
8, 21
sphere.
While planning the high pressure water feed connection from the fire water system into the storage tank (con9
sidering the selected high pressure pump):
- specify flexible hose rated for high enough pressure (30 bara) - validate with vendor/supplier,
- as a back up plan for hose failure/leak, prepare in advance a fixed piping, or prepare sufficient fixed pipes
and joints parts, to assemble connection on the spot.
Plan strict use of the validated and calibrated equipment (e.g., pressure and level measurements), validate also
12
high pressure water specific rate, to be received from the contracted inspector.
Plan in a detail where to install blind flanges at the storage tank connections, in order to assure tightness at the
12
connections during the high pressure test.
In recommendation 1 consider also correct sequence of actions to lower the water pressure in task 13 (13.3, re- 13
lated to the potential high pressure water jet, injuring the personnel).
Plan the electrical wiring and electrical installations to be installed only from the top opening, and not from the 16, 18,
bottom opening, in order to prevent electrocution hazards, related to the potentially falling objects/tools for vis- 20
ual inspections, ultrasound testing and X-ray testing, expected to be done inside the storage tank.
Check with the insurance company about the liability coverage on cold water testing procedure, considering the All
own and the contracted personnel, as well as the equipment used/present.
Recommendation

es with increasing severity – categories following a
ladder approach:
i. procedural risks (work delays); examples are
too few fitter personnel at piping re-assembly,
a too short crane arm too short to perform for
PSVs removal from at the top of the
spheresphere top, as well as a possible low
flowrate water flow rate unknown in advance
for sphere fill-up.
ii. occupational safety risks; examples are personnel injuries due to LPG torch flame-off/on,
work at height (sphere top), suffocation or
electrocution hazards inside sphere, etc.

iii.

process safety risks; examples are damages to
equipment and/or personnel in juries/fatalities
due to water ingress into compressor, tank
sphere static overload with water (deteriorated
legs), spheres damage by applying pressure
above 25 bar, etc.
For the sake of brevity, the additional safety
measures are were compiled as a list of recommendations to be incorporate into the detailed toverall
testing procedure by the plant manager – reported in
Table 1.
The TASK HAZID HAZOP study also rendered
some additional tasks to be planned, possible rescheduling of subtaskstheir optimal order changed,

Table 2: Summary of recommendation from the optimization step (considering top 5 out of 22 overall tasks (22.7%), related to
69 % of overall anticipated time needed.
#
1

Duration
Main Task
(h)
72
16-Re-assemble entry flanges,
primary valves and safety release valves (after previous
completed)

Optimization opportunities
a.) Evaluate alternative to apply more personnel at re-assembly task for entry flanges and
SRVs, as overall man-hours needed should be
the same, thus less time here.
b.) Evaluate alternatives in organizing work on
8 h per day, against e.g., 24 ur-7 days per week
basis, for whole testing procedure.
c.) Expected water flow rate into is unknown;
plan and perform a small scale tank fill-up test
using same conditions and equipment in order
to get at least some estimate.
d.) Consider using larger pipework (over 2")
and/or shorter pipework, in order to increase
water flow out rate and save time here.
e.) Assess and plan which tasks and sub-tasks
can run in parallel, e.g., this one during water
flow out sub-task.

2

64

5-Fill with water

3

50

10-Lower water pressure

4

48

5

24

8-Install inspection equipment
(this can be done from task 4
onward or more than likely during the filling with water)
12-Visual inspection from inside f.) Consider more inspection personnel to
(this task can be performed after speed up the work.
the valves underneath have been
dismantled)

or specific precautions to be added. In general, this
led to the update of the task analysis and its report,
leading us to the Original as well as Optimized versions of the report and related graphical diagrams
from the SCOPE programme – both are simultaneously presented for comparative purposes on Figure
4. The reader will note that someSome tasks were
merged (e.g., 9 and 10 merged into a new 9) in order
to emphasise closely connected sub-tasks, decisions
were explicitly added (new task 17, old 17 became
18), some were added (final 25), thus leading to 22
top level tasks in the Optimized alternative.
3.4 Optimization
Having obtained the Optimized list of tasks to be
pursued within the testing procedure, the assessment
of the total duration done, being assessed to about
372 hours (15.6 days), considering 24 h per day and
7 days per week work. After consultations with the
plant management, it was spotted that some tasks indeed need more time than others (not a surprise),
and some could be accelerated using more resources
(e.g., contracted personnel) while same man-hours
product is needed. The general optimization approach was to perform a time Pareto style analysis,
namely, sorting the main tasks in decreasing duration time (info collected in task analysis), and for
those most lengthy ones to discuss the alternatives
for shorten them. The results are presented in Table
2. We can note that top 5 main tasks out of total 22

Duration (%)
each
cumulative
19.2
19.2

17.1

36.3

13.4

49.7

12.8

62.5

6.4

69.0

(22.7 %) are related to cumulative 69 % of total time
envisaged, being about 372 hours.
While not exactly following the proposed 80/20
Pareto rule, the similarity (69/23) provided additional insights about tasks that are worth of time optimization. In addition, for those tasks optimization opportunities were listed, and are to be added to the
previous list in Table 1.
4 CONCLUSIONS
The approach to design and plan for safety is proposed in this paperr. It consists of interconnected
methods and tools used to applyfor task analysis, 4D
simulations, safety analysishazard identification and
optimization for a complex, hard to visualizecomplex testing and or overhaul operations. The approach ahs been tested on a case study consisting on
pressure testing of LPG tanks and it case study use
of the proposed approach appears to be a very good
example of its use. The case study provided 20 specific recommendations overall for the industrial
partner’s management ofon how to plan in detail a
rare and demandingthis infrequent and demanding
testing procedure. However, the approach could be
easily used or demonstrated onapplied on any other
safety or production critical operation, above
all,especially when the tasks are hard to visualize ad
the human factors play a relevant role in it procedures and human operation play a relevant role, as in
the case under study and, more in general,(e.g. for

batch processes and operations). The fFurther work
on this approach will involve its field verification
against the actual (the actual testing procedure is
planned fto take place inor May 2015. The verification will check whether the method missed on ) in
terms “were any important tasks, or risks when
comparing the actual activity with its missed in the
analysis/planning phase.?” In addition, the authors
plan toare currently working on perform a probabilistic risk assessment for of the overall procedure
comparatively consideringto compare the Original
and the Optimized procedure alternatives and link it
withand use the data in athe cost-benefit analysis of
the risk mitigated against avoided against the costs
of the performing the analysis and careful procedure
planningrecommendations identified.
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